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Abstract: Despite recent controversies over the ontological status of scale, 
geographers have continued to interrogate so-called 'scalar practices'. But not 
enough has been said about the skill involved in making these practices 
successful. Geographers have overlooked the potential for thinking through the 
craft of scalar practices. I therefore introduce 'scalecraft', a concept which builds 
upon existing work and is intended to draw attention to and elaborate upon the 
skills, aptitudes, and experiences at issue in working with scale. A relatively 
diverse set of secondary materials selected from recent academic literature is used 
first to demonstrate how scalar practices entail failures, learning, complex 
machinations, and innovations. I then use materials from my own research in 
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South Africa into white farmers' practices which fashion an organic scale of 
action amidst a space-time of uncertainty and insecurity.  
 
Introduction  
As is well known, ''traditional Euclidian, Cartesian and Westphalian notions of 
geographical scale as a fixed, bounded, self-enclosed and pregiven container'' 
(Brenner, 2001, page 592) have been challenged and largely replaced by work 
that examines how scale is actively (re)constructed, contested, and is, hence, 
fundamentally political (eg, Brenner, 1998; 2001; Cox, 1998; Jonas, 1994; 
Marston, 2000; Swyngedouw, 2000). This literature on the 'politics of scale' has 
been to a large extent inspired by developments such as 'globalization', the rise of 
subnationalist regionalisms, devolution, economic crises afflicting national 
welfare state systems, or new developments within capitalist societies leading to 
increased interurban competition. A wide range of research agendas have thus 
emerged to capture and theorize the 'scalarity' of sociospatial life.  
 
Geographers' shift from a taken-for-granted, fixed, and stable understanding of 
scale to a new and much more exciting set of conceptualizations has yielded 
numerous benefits. One development is the notion that actors engage in scalar 
practices. Such practices include state-driven attempts to rescale governance; 
examples of actors using scalar discourses about the local or the global; or cases 
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of social movement activism which deliberate over and target particular scales of 
action. Human actors-whether individuals, social groups, or governing bodies 
(such as governments or state agencies)-'produce' and 'use' scale in all manner of 
attempts to create some sort of advantage, to establish associations, connections, 
or solidarities across social divides, or to represent their interests (to be heard or 
seen) amidst oppressive or otherwise difficult conditions.  
 
Surprisingly, however, and although a wide range of scalar practices are now 
fundamentally at issue in human geography, not enough attention has been given 
to questions about the success or failure of these practices. Does working with 
scale, such as deploying a scalar discourse, or establishing a new institution 
which nestles within a scalar hierarchy, require skill? And if there is skill 
involved in the production process, is there scope to identify and elaborate upon 
the craft at issue?  
 
This paper blends primary and secondary materials regarding sometimes skilful 
and at other times failing scalar practices to demonstrate how social actors 
practise what I refer to as 'scalecraft'-a concept which draws attention to the 
aptitude, skill, and experience embedded within (yet poorly elaborated upon in 
geographers' discussions of) scalar practices. I argue that scalecraft focuses 
attention on and places value in understanding when scalar practices fail, not just 
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when they succeed, and why. In turn, new sets of questions emerge: for example, 
about the political significance of practising scale (in)effectively, or about how 
geographically uneven development interrupts scalecraft. My contribution aims 
to build on the current literature on scale towards developing a strengthened 
understanding of scalar practices.  
 
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. I elaborate on the concept of 
scalecraft in the next section. I explain in more detail why the concept has 
mileage and precisely what its benefits are for sociospatial thinking in general 
and scale theorists in particular. Then, in a fairly long discussion, I introduce a 
range of examples which highlight the craft of scalar practices. The cases to 
which I call attention entail diverse and complex practices of ''skilfully 
fashioning'' [a phrase I borrow from Clifford (1986, page 6)] geographic scale. 
The basic point is to demonstrate that, if we view scale as a social product, then 
we need to consider the craft that can be involved. My argument would not be 
complete, however, without some qualifications. In the third section of the paper, 
then, I use some primary materials from research I have conducted in South 
Africa. Specifically, I introduce the case of white farmers who have responded to 
the threat of violent 'farm attacks' by crafting an organic scale of action which 
entails volunteer patrols at night. I use these materials to demonstrate a key point: 
that the craft of practising scale is only ever a partial solution to social problems, 
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precisely because of the ''throwntogetherness'' (Massey, 2005) of place and space. 
Finally, in the concluding section, I look beyond the specific materials presented 
here to identify some broader implications of thinking about the craft of scalar 
practices.  
 
From 'scalar practices' to 'scalecraft'  
The intellectual biography of scale in geography is impressive. It has matured 
from a stable, bounded, taken-for-granted notion to its current state as a 
fundamentally contested, complex, but yet central, concept in the discipline. 
Much of the intellectual effort up till now has gone into contributing to that 
maturing process. As such, a series of critical points have been made about the 
concept. One is that scale is a social product: that it is human actors in their 
relations with each other that produce understandings of local and global, say; or 
that scales of governance are products of the social process. Subsequent 
contributions have developed the initial points about the social production of 
scale. We now agree, for example, that it matters if agents rescale social life, 
deploy scalar discourses, or jump scales. Geographers, in short, have 
demonstrated that scalarity is central to the unfolding of sociospatial processes. 
Most (if not all) contributors to the scale literature recognize that working with, 
or producing, scale is a political act and hence is tricky, messy, and awkward. 
Scalar practices are not straightforward: rather, they entail complexities, 
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difficulties, and skill. Glassman (2002), for example, has traced some of the 
intricacies involved in Thai activists' efforts to 'jump scale' and to access and use 
international policy communities to apply pressure on the nation-state. 'Jumping' 
to meet up with power requires skill and luck. 'Rescaling', such as attempts to 
transform political struggles, is another scalar practice that is far from 
straightforward. Harvey (1996), for example, makes this point when he discusses 
the difficulties of extending and so rescaling the political possibilities of all the 
world's different militant particularisms, which is necessary, he says, ''if socialism 
is to break out of its local bonds and become a viable alternative to capitalism as 
a working mode of production and social relations'' (page 23). The difficulty is 
making the move from understanding the dynamics of struggle in one place to 
struggle generally, and understanding, too, the principles that can guide action at 
those two different scales. Producing a global scale of action is far from easy.  
 
More generally, a scalar fix or structuration, as Brenner (2001) notes, ''hinges 
crucially upon its embeddedness within dense webs of relations to other scales 
and spaces'' (page 606), which thereby alerts us to the range of negotiations and 
difficulties of chance occurrences that affect how scalar practices are played out.  
Beyond theorizing how scalar practices involve difficulties and complexities, the 
scale literature in geography also draws attention to the importance of 
effectiveness. Consider here that, as political geographers have been at pains to 
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demonstrate, some appeals to the 'global' or the 'local', or attempts to defend or 
promote the 'region', do not meet their objectives (eg Agnew, 1995). Or consider 
that corporate giants, free-trade extremists, and agitating governments might seek 
out massive, highly complex entities to govern and organize world trade; but, as 
the recent Doha round of WTO talks has demonstrated, such attempts can falter.  
 
Third, there is the case of Fiat's mission to globalize its activities and take 
advantage of neoliberal reforms in 'emerging markets', which failed to live up to 
expectations and contributed to a process of considerable corporate restructuring 
(Dunford, 2009). Scalar practices do not always succeed. In this light, Moore 
(2008) suggests that we ''conceptualize scaleness as a contingent event that may 
or may not occur. Alert to the fact that scale-making projects may fail to produce 
high degrees of scaleness we can begin to explore failed attempts'' (page 219).  
My aim in this paper is to build on geographers' work on the complexities and 
intricacies of scalar practices in general, and then on Moore's proposition in 
particular, by suggesting that our theorizations of scale need to take into account 
more fully the skills, aptitudes, and experiences involved in producing, working 
with, or exploiting geographic scale. The problem with which I seek to grapple is 
not so much that geographers have failed to take into consideration difficulties or 
struggles or failures, but rather that the scale literature has not dwelled enough on 
the skill at work in scalar practices.  
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My approach is to conceive and call for a deeper understanding of 'scalecraft', 
which I understand as the craft of scalar practices. I use the term 'craft' here in a 
similar way to Sennett (2008) in his fascinating historical study of the craft 
worker. The craft worker almost seems a thing of the past now, particularly in the 
light of developments in the capitalist labour process which increasingly make 
craft work redundant. But, although Taylorism has stripped down, simplified, and 
deskilled the labour process (Braverman, 1974), craft still occurs initially in 
production processes and so craft persists and still matters. And at issue in 
thinking about craft work are the workshops in which it develops, as well as the 
''hesitations and mistakes'' (Sennett, 2008, page 116), even the willingness to 
commit errors, make repairs, and develop improvements. All these features of 
craft work apply to scalar practices, as I aim to discuss in this paper.  
 
I argue that thinking about scalecraft helps us avoid the risk that, as we move 
beyond the once-radical step of imagining scale as a social product, we begin to 
take for granted and hence downplay the complexities of that idea. The term 'the 
social production of scale' must not be understood as implying a straightforward 
process of production devoid of difficulties, redesigns, alterations, and re-
conceptualizations. Things are rarely easily produced. As Latour has noted, 
''Chemists, rocket scientists, and physicists are used to seeing their laboratories 
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explode'' (2005, page 99). In other words, failure has to be accepted and expected 
in any production process. Initially, then, my introduction of the scalecraft 
concept is only a re-characterization of existing and widely recognized points 
about scale: my aim is to communicate that geographers need to be cognisant of, 
and sensitive to, the difficulties and complexities of working with and negotiating 
geographic scale to meet social needs.  
 
I suggest that scalecraft alerts us to the skill and artisanal dimension of scalar 
practices, such as jumping scale, rescaling, or the practice of maintaining the 
effectiveness of a social movement's operations at multiple scales (eg see Bosco, 
2001). Scalecraft focuses on the skills in negotiating spaces of engagement, 
which occur when the threat of falling profits, say, leads a capitalist firm in the 
US to 'upscale' and seek federal support (eg Cox, 1998), or when a region or state 
in Europe tries to 'rescale' its territory to seek structural funds from the European 
Union (eg Boyle, 2000). I argue that scalecraft draws our attention to actors' 
skills and agency amidst the structures of opportunity and constraint that 
constitute the politics of scale, which involves questions of governance and the 
scale division of the state.  
 
The concept is analogous to-but in key respects different from-statecraft, which is 
the craft that states practice when they act politically, for example, in diplomacy 
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with other states. Statecraft also draws our attention to the skill and propensity for 
failure embedded within territorial action. Crucially, however, scalecraft is not 
the preserve of elites, rulers, or governments. Rather, and as I demonstrate at 
numerous stages in the following discussion, scalecraft can be a 'bottom-up' 
affair. The concept is useful, then, insofar as it is explicitly about broadening the 
imagined range of actors that are active in the politics of scale.  
 
Finally, I find the concept useful in the light of the fluid theoretical landscape 
wrought by the 'flat ontology' thesis (Marston et al, 2005). A crucial part of the 
flat ontology thesis is the claim that the political and intellectual benefits of 
thinking about scale are miniscule relative to the costs (such as, for political 
movements), of viewing scales as nested within a rigid hierarchy. Indeed, 
political mobilization amidst an imagined scalar hierarchy can be disempowering 
for 'local' or other scale-specific political movements, especially if the 'higher up' 
scales seem all powerful. But rather than pursuing hybrid or nonhierarchical 
notions of scale, Marston et al's 'antiscale' (Jonas, 2006) innovation has been to 
imagine a world without scale. The proposal is a flat ontology, which means 
abandoning human geography's ''golden egg'' (Hoefle, 2006). My view is that 
abandoning scale is impossible so long as people continue to imagine and talk 
about and operate as if scales such as local, regional, or global exist [this is the 
'narrative' argument for retaining scale laid out by Jonas (2006)]. But abandoning 
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scale also is impossible so long as institutions, associations, or groups exist to 
govern and manage and oversee, or to assemble and arrange, actors or 
information within specific borders or territories. The issue for human geography 
is not, therefore, just ''what people do with scale categories'' (Moore, 2008, page 
217, emphasis added), but also what scale-specific entities do, why, and with 
what (social, economic, political) consequences. There are scalar discourses and 
specific entities with scale-specific properties for us to study. And numerous 
actors, even at the microscale (eg see Ettlinger, 2007b), practise scale. Insofar as 
scalecraft calls attention to the skills involved in such practices, I argue that it 
reaffirms the need for human geographers to persist with, not abandon, scale. As  
 
I demonstrate in the following discussion, paying attention to the craft of scalar 
practices alerts us to important questions about the way actors intervene in and 
produce spatiality.  
 
Places of learning, experiencing, and practising scalecraft  
Becoming a craft worker requires a place to practise, and entails learning, the 
freedom to make adaptations and improvements, and the capacity to repair. It is 
about more than skill alone. The idea that scale is produced suggests there might 
be some craft involved and, indeed, there is evidence to support that claim, given 
that we can discern places in which scalecraft is practised-the workshops-and in 
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which failures can occur. Consider here the case of Franco's transformation of the 
hydraulic environment in Spain (Swyngedouw, 2007). Franco's 'hydro-social 
dream' entailed scalar practices that sought to transform Spain's environment and 
achieve nationalist homogenization. Constructing Spain's new nature required a 
network of inter-river-basin water transfers which, crucially, demanded, ''the up-
scaling of the management and planning of water resources from the scale of the 
river basin to the national scale, national integration, a centralized hydraulic 
administration and a strong national state that had centralized and absolute power 
over the waters of the country'' (Swyngedouw, 2007, page 12). Spain's new 
hydrological world sought purposively to diminish the influence of actors at other 
geographic scales, particularly the regional Confederations (pages 12-13); that is, 
rescaling water was intended to undermine regionalist and autonomist desires and 
demands. Franco's project also sat beside efforts to attract support at other 
geographical scales, such as by rescaling Spain's 'network of interests' via signing 
the Pact of Madrid with the US in 1953, after which US funds enabled dam 
construction to expand rapidly (page 23). Franco's venture of rescaling the 
politics of water within Spain, whilst also rescaling Spain's position within 
international geopolitics, delivered the technonatural revolution. It was a creative 
and imaginative project that required quite skilful efforts to establish and manage 
successfully (at times, conflictive) relations with actors at multiple scales. Yet 
part of the project failed. Franco's political agenda did not live on after his death. 
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And although controlling water is an attempt to concretise the nation's power, 
regionalist and autonomist pressures have proved to be far more resilient. Thus 
Franco's ambition was to rescale water management within a specific territory: 
Spain, his scalar workshop. His ambitions failed. But this is, I argue, as much as 
we should expect with the craft of working with scale.  
 
Given that failures occur, then, those who establish institutions or governance 
structures within and over a specific territory must engage in an ongoing learning 
process. Attention to colonial settings can provide useful lessons about the ways 
in which scalecraft is learned via attempts to govern, to dominate and to subject. 
A good example here is from modern East Asian history. Henry (2005) uses 
Japanese popular ethnographies on colonial Korea to discuss how colonial 
systems targeted Korean bodies in urban areas and disciplined them into 
following specific hygienic practices. The colonizer's ethnographies constructed 
cultural differences between Japanese and Korean around sanitary practices; 
differences which supposedly pivoted on the notion of a ''sanitarily advanced 
Japan and a purportedly hygienically backward Korea'' (page 649). Whereas the 
Japanese colonizer used 'Western' toilets and defecated using sanitary practices, 
the ethnographies claimed that Korean customs lacked any care for cleanliness: 
the people ''carelessly dispos[e] of their human waste in the city's waterways'' and 
contribute to the ''foul smell of human and animal feces, which were supposedly 
 14 
strewn all over the city's streets'' (Henry, 2005, page 651). In imagining Korea as 
a ''shit country'' and Seoul as its ''shit capital'' (page 651), the ''imperial 
representations of urban filth'' told by colonial ethnographies ''opened up a space 
for further Japanese interventions in the form of colonial projects'', especially 
''sanitizing projects that might serve both to clean up the city and bring Japan 
profit'' (page 653, my emphasis). Thus, the Japanese colonial rulers rolled out a 
''draconian system of sanitary reforms'', in which a new scale of urban 
governance-the Seoul Sanitation Association (SSA)-was charged with ''disposing 
human excrement, collecting garbage, and dredging ditches for sewerage'' (page 
656). Seoulites were expected to pay the SSA's sanitation fee, a price many could 
not afford, thereby leading to some waste remaining uncollected. Whereas human 
waste was collected everyday by fertilizer merchants prior to the colonial era, 
''Japanese sanitation companies come around to collect once every ten or twenty 
days, [so] shit piles up like mounds in and around people's houses'' (cited by 
Henry, 2005, page 656). Thus, after losing access to the human-waste economy, 
Korean fertilizer merchants suffered financial losses and Korean farmers were 
forced to pay much more than they had become accustomed for their manure 
supply-an outcome which deepened the conditions of colonial subjugation and 
helped pave the way for further settlement by Japanese farmers.  
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Crucially, however, none of these colonial attempts to govern Seoul were com-
pletely successful. Colonial subjects resisted the SSA and Japanese domination in 
other realms of life, such as public bathrooms. Beyond collecting waste, the SSA 
installed and monitored public bathrooms and toilets; it also established 
neighbourhood sanitation cooperatives, organized personal hygiene lectures and 
slide shows, and even forced police-led house cleanings on Koreans. Such 
attempts to discipline and regulate the colonial subject went in tandem with 
narratives and representations that justified further Japanese interventions-within 
the city and across Korea as a whole-and which sought to embolden the more 
global Japanese colonial project: the Korean other was to become civilized thanks 
to the superior Japanese colonizer. Thus, whilst Japan's imperial project entailed 
looking down at and taking into account conditions across all colonized spaces 
(that is, its geographic scale was larger and wider than, say, the city of Seoul 
alone), it also necessarily entailed directing policies and projects at governing 
individual bodies, situated within particular places, which required disciplining 
practices wrapped up with interventions at wider geographic scales (the SSA, for 
instance): achieving empire at one scale hinged (at least in part) on altering 
practices at the scale of the body; and controlling colonial subjects' bodies 
entailed creating institutions that would operate across the scale of the city. The 
project of incorporating Koreans ''into the fold of colonial modernity'' (Henry, 
2005, page 642) required top-down, site-specific scalar practices that recast 
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conditions at the microscale; creating Empire required learning about how to use 
scalecraft.  
 
So far I have referred to top-down uses of scalecraft: cases of national or colonial 
governments altering the sociospatial conditions in specific sites. But scalar 
practices can be bottom-up, too, and can entail looking to multiple sites; the craft 
in working with scale is not just about states affecting 'their' territories. In this 
regard, therefore, scalecraft is in the toolkit or handbag of a much wider array of 
agents than is statecraft.  
 
Consider here Ong's (2007) contribution to our understanding of neoliberalism, 
specifically her book on what she defines as the ''neo-liberal exception'' in the 
Asian Pacific region. One of her explorations concerns a set of actors that tend to 
be ignored in more Atlantic-centred analyses: an elite group of ethnic Chinese 
managers and entrepreneurs. She discusses how they skilfully negotiate the risks 
inherent in volatile and rapidly changing transpacific trade networks. Her subjects 
exert ''lateral influence'' across multiple ''political domains'' (Ong, 2007, page 
124) and manipulate and in turn benefit from the way neoliberalism nestles 
within the uneven geography of labour regimes and citizenship systems. In so 
doing, ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, managers, and technologists practise what 
she defines as 'latitudinal citizenship', that is, a form of citizenship which grants 
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rights and possibilities and which offers freedoms and opportunities to exploit 
workforces and accumulate wealth in innovative ways in multiple sites. In a 
space -time context of precarity and volatility, these beneficiaries of neo-
liberalization negotiate societal change by crafting out niches in multiple sites 
and by exploiting the unevenness of citizenship systems.  
 
Ong calls attention here to a matter that has considerable relevance to 
geographers: citizenship-its uneven geography, and messiness. Thus, and for 
example, at the same time as Ong highlights how some ethnic Chinese managers 
and entrepreneurs exercise latitudinal citizenship, she also profiles the labour 
system through which Filipino and Indonesian women subsidize the Singaporean 
economy. In contrast to Chinese entrepreneurs, who benefit from citizenship 
systems, Filipino and Indonesian women lack citizenship rights in their place of 
work and have almost meaningless citizenship rights in their place of origin. A 
critical lesson from Ong's work is that practising (or lacking) a particular type of 
citizenship presents opportunities for some individuals to negotiate 
neoliberalization processes and the changing place of the individual in society. 
Citizenship is not simply a set of rights, something given or 'owned': it is, rather, 
something that can be performed, manipulated, and exploited in different 
contexts.  
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Besides Ong's case study, there are other examples of individuals practising or 
performing citizenship. Also in the Pacific region, for example, there is the case 
of 'astronaut families', in which ethnic Chinese parents live and work in Hong 
Kong whilst their children are educated in Vancouver (Waters, 2003). Such 
'flexible' practices take into account the risk of political instability or economic 
shifts such that a changing context does not prove disastrous. Wealthy 
entrepreneurs, investors, or sports stars practise a latitudinal form of citizenship 
and exploit the uneven geography of taxation systems by 'earning' or 
accumulating wealth in one economy but paying low rates of tax in another. The 
notion that citizenship is practised underpins purposeful attempts by social 
movement activists to work with, rather than against, the state in a form of 
cooperative, rather than conflictive, politics (Alvarez, 1998; see also Ettlinger, 
2007a), although it is worth noting that citizenship can be practised with respect 
to a particular political domain at the scale of the city or the nation-state as well 
as across political boundaries.  
 
A focus on differentiated and messy geographies of citizenship can provide 
insights into how human actors negotiate (or experience) societal change. And 
these sorts of practices are especially relevant to any discussion about scale 
because they demonstrate that some individuals can manipulate and take 
advantage of the scalar landscape between bodies, neighbourhoods, cities, and 
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nation-states. What Ong also alerts us to is the scope which Chinese 
entrepreneurs have purposefully to diminish the influence of actors at certain 
geographic scales, such as employees in specific workplaces in California, as 
well as to appeal for support at other scales, such as by lobbying Congress for H-
1B work visas. Chinese capitalists practise a form of bottom-up scale-craft that 
looks simultaneously at multiple sites and manipulates conditions to suit their 
needs.  
 
Like statecraft, or indeed witchcraft, then, the notion of scalecraft implies a 
degree of conjuring, of drawing upon available resources and creating reactions 
that have a decidedly hybrid character. Ong's work highlights practices that evoke 
the concept of scalecraft because her subjects learn from mistakes and adapt their 
strategies; any craft needs this process of failure and improvement. Scalecraft can 
be viewed here as a highly spatial technology used to deliver specific results. 
Ong's subjects demonstrate the capacity to act at and exploit scales of action as a 
mechanism to ameliorate against threats, or to take advantage of opportunities 
amidst a space -time of volatility, uncertainty, and precarity.  
 
So scalecraft requires 'workshops'-spaces and places for 'rolling out' scalar prac-
tices-and necessarily entails failure, learning, and adaptation. But, as in all crafts, 
scalecraft also entails innovation. An especially clear way to envision the 
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innovative side of scalecraft is via the Schumpeterian term 'creative destruction', 
which Tickell and Peck (2003) have used to improve how we understand 
'neoliberalism'. The notion of roll-out (creative) and roll-back (destructive) 
neoliberalism points towards the morphing, evolving, and grafting character of 
the project, as well as its treacherous, uncaring, and ambitious side. To borrow 
from Latour (2005), its destructive side is about disassembling, whilst its creative 
side is about reassembling disparate forces, players, and entities into a new 
assemblage which pulls together players in ''centres of discursive production'', 
''ideological heartlands'', as well as ''frontiers of extension and mediation'' (Tickell 
and Peck, 2003, page 164). Thus the neoliberal project has been advanced by 
demolition crews, gangsters, and thieves and by flexible and adaptable 
innovators, agitators, and artisans; it has been supported by a powerful 'creative 
class' promoting a story embraced by a highly diverse audience.  
 
Part of the skill of neoliberalism's supporters has been to draw attention away 
from its underlying objective-to reassert class power and 'free' capitalist firms and 
the wealthy from progressive taxation or overly ambitious redistributive states: to 
increase material inequality. This skilful fashioning of sociospatial conditions has 
required selling a wide range of messages tailored to fit particular audiences: so, 
depending on the place or time, it is modern, British, American Islamic, pro-
women, antidiscrimination, pro-economic-growth, anti-stagnation, ambitious, 
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entrepreneurial, smart, and so on. Neoliberal protagonists and their messages 
have skilfully found allies within capitalist states (Harvey, 2005).  
 
Thus, creating and sustaining the neoliberal assemblage has involved exploratory, 
hence experimental and adaptable, ''neoliberal forms of statecraft'' (Tickell and 
Peck, 2003, page 179; my emphasis). Statecraft, then, but also scalecraft, 
particularly because neoliberalization has entailed rescaling social and spatial life 
in diverse ways using innovative learned, practised, skilled, and fundamentally 
political techniques and technologies. State powers, for example, have been 
rescaled, often away from the national state and towards new institutions and 
organizations which seek to coordinate financial markets or trade and to promote 
a neoliberal-style agenda almost regardless of what specific national governments 
would like. A prominent feature on this neoliberal landscape is the towering 
presence of transnational corporations. Their upscaled activities reflect the 
experiences they have had of working with, taking advantage of, or applying 
pressure on national governments: they have rescaled their production networks 
such that many now stretch over and through multiple states and have a degree of 
reach and connectedness that few preglobalization (or pre-neoliberalization) 
entities could manage. Their spatial power gives them leverage. But transnational 
corporations also have liabilities, such as embeddedness within particular 
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markets, reliance upon specific regulatory power, or indeed contracts from 
certain territorial states. Spatial power, then, but not unfettered.  
 
Other examples of scalecraft amidst neoliberalism include scalar discourses 
which stress the vulnerability of the national state to 'international competition' or 
'globalization', which in turn is supposed to justify dismantling hard-fought-for 
welfare states or legislation that protects trade unions. Scalar discourses 
accompany neoliberal-style rolling back and rolling out. As such, the destructive-
disassembling/creative -reassembling moments of the advance of neoliberalism 
have had to entail scalar practices: rescaling as well as scale jumping; TNCs up-
scaling to exert pressure on national governments; or new scalar discourses about 
the inevitability of market-ruled life amidst globalization. The creative, 
reassembling, and innovative dimensions of the neoliberal project speak to the 
craft that has been involved and developed.  
 
Resistance to the neoliberal project also entails scalecraft. ''Scale is'', as Leitner 
and Miller (2007, page 121) point out, ''one important dimension of strategies of 
social action and is the subject of intense debate among many social movements.'' 
A crucial question facing movements opposing neoliberalization-and a question 
geographers have been well positioned to address -is ''[w]hat is the most effective 
scale for organizing? Quite often the conclusion reached is to pursue a 
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coordinated multi-scalar politics to effectively respond to the shifting politics of 
neoliberalism.'' More broadly, a challenge facing geographers is ''in 
understanding the articulation of diverse spatialities and, in turn, what this means 
for more effective emancipatory politics'' (page 121). I argue that scale-craft is 
integral to the working out of these 'diverse spatialities', particularly because 
emancipatory politics often demands the skilful rescaling of social life or the 
deployment of a scalar discourse about the local or the global. Arguably, learning 
scalecraft is a fundamental dimension of emancipatory politics.  
 
Scalecraft: only a partial solution  
I have presented materials on Franco's Spain, colonial Korea, Chinese 
entrepreneurs in the US -Asian Pacific, and the modern-day global political 
economy to propose that we can discern numerous examples of scalar practices 
which evoke skill, aptitude, experimentation, learning, experience, and 
innovation. The examples indicate that scalecraft has numerous elements. The 
case of Franco's Spain demonstrates that scalar practices can be simultaneously 
material and discursive. Colonial Korea draws attention to the top-down and site-
specific focus of scalar practices, and the case of Chinese entrepreneurs indicates 
that it can be more bottom-up and involve multiple sites at the same time. The 
case of the neoliberal assemblage and its advance draws attention to the centrality 
of politically charged actions by diverse actors that draw upon a wide range of 
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experiences to rescale social and spatial life. Producing a scale of action, or using 
a scalar discourse, is far from straightforward. Skills are involved. There is a 
craft. Lessons are learned and practices improved, which means there is a desire 
for perfection among those who pursue scalar practices.  
 
But a crucial caveat is needed here: I want to suggest that the craft of scalar 
practices can never ensure complete success. Whereas a skilfully made violin will 
get the job done, scalecraft is always contingent and experimental. Scalecraft is 
for those who practise it is only ever a partial solution to the problems posed by 
wider uneven, intersecting geographies. Jessop's view of governance provides 
some clues here. He notes that governance is prone to fail, partly because of its 
complex nature, but also because of interactions with unexpected objects, 
features, or events (1998, page 43; 2005, page 228). In other words, many 
unanticipated, sometimes chaotic, always intersecting, and uneven geographies 
get in the way of governance. Likewise, unexpected geographies get in the way 
of scalecraft. To demonstrate this point in some more detail, I now turn to an 
example from some research I have conducted in rural South Africa.  
 
Crafting a new laager  
At issue here is the response of some white commercial farmers to South Africa's 
much-publicised 'farm attacks', which in the KwaZulu-Natal case have been 
 25 
vividly described in Jonny Steinberg's (2002) Midlands. Precise figures about 
these sorts of attacks vary considerably, but organizations such as the Transvaal 
Agricultural Union claim that up to 1700 white farmers have been killed since 
1994. Of course, it has to be noted that the media profile given to farm attacks 
dwarfs the degree to which persistent white-on-black violence in rural areas is 
reported (Human Rights Commission, 2003); and the attacks occur against the 
backdrop of a more general upsurge in violent crime across South Africa. But 
1700 deaths is still a large number, and for the white farmers, the numbers are so 
stark because violence against white farmers had been utterly unimaginable until 
the end of apartheid-which is obviously a crucial part of the context here.  
 
Also central to understanding so-called farm attacks is the South African govern-
ment's stuttering land-reform programme, which promised but has largely failed 
to deliver land to, and improvements in the lives of, black South Africans in the 
'white countryside' and in the country's former 'homelands' (Lahiff, 2007). Land 
reform has introduced a new level of complexity to many parts of rural South 
Africa. For example, restitution, which is one strand of the land-reform 
programme, seeks to restore land rights to individuals or communities who have 
suffered forced dispossession since 1913. In some areas of the country, white 
farmers have been under pressure to make way for restitution by agreeing to sell 
their farms (Fraser, 2007). Some of that pressure is political; but some farmers 
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suggest that attacks have been orchestrated by the government to add to that 
pressure.  
 
Thus, in response to fears about farm attacks and actual incidents that have 
occurred (for example, during the time I conducted research in South Africa, one 
farmer I had interviewed was killed at the entrance to his farm), some white 
farmers in the 'Plaasvaal' (not the real name) area of South Africa have run 
monthly 'farm-security weekends'. I attended and participated in one such event 
as part of a separate research project I conducted in late 2004; here, I briefly 
describe what happened.  
 
The majority of instructors were men, but most participants were women, includ-
ing farmers' wives, partners, or daughters, and other female farmers or farm 
workers. All of the participants, except for one Asian man, were white. We sat on 
the first night in a hall and listened to Stephan (not his real name-I have changed 
all names), a well-built and imposing former security service officer, who 
provided figures on the number of farm attacks. One statistic claimed that, on a 
per capita basis, more white farmers were killed on a yearly basis in South Africa 
than US soldiers in Iraq. He described what happens during farm attacks: men 
were shot in the head and back; women were raped; dogs were killed. The 
attackers were sometimes looking for weapons; sometimes nothing was stolen. It 
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was not clear, Stephan said, whether the state could be absolved of any 
responsibility; certainly, he argued, the state had done little to prevent the attacks 
and provided an inefficient level of protection to white farmers. The only option 
for white farmers, he argued, was for them to work together: to operate farm-
security patrols; to learn how to defend property; what to look for prior to an 
attack; how to use all sorts of weapons. As such, the organizers aimed to train all 
participants in the use of a wide range of weapons, including revolvers, pistols, 
shotguns, and even AK47s.  
 
The first firing practice began at a firing range elsewhere on the farm on the 
Saturday morning. I stood next to a woman in my group waiting to fire the first 
shot. I asked her how she felt. She said she ''hated guns'' and didn't want to be 
there; but her neighbours had been attacked and she wanted to feel more secure. 
The firing range was intended to build our confidence in using a weapon. The 
subsequent stages were about learning how to use weapons under intense 
pressure. We moved to a hostage scenario: 50 yards from the firing range was a 
mock house (actually, just tarpaulin tied between poles to mimic the spatial 
layout of a house, with rooms, corners, and the necessary angles around which 
we were to sweep in search of the hostage and the hostage taker). We had to 
sweep through the house and fire live rounds at targets without hitting the 
hostages. Then, in the final stage, and with a passenger in a car, we had to drive 
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towards a target and, in second gear travelling at about 15 mph, lean back almost 
into the lap of the passenger, fire two rounds, drive to the next target, stop the 
bakkie (pick-up truck) and fire two more rounds, before moving up into first gear 
again, pass the third target and fire two final rounds. Jean explained the purpose 
of the final stage. 
 
Numerous attacks happen when you're in your bakkie and coming home to your  
farm from town or from church. You slow down from the main road and turn left  
onto your property. As you slow down, you see three attackers come at you. You 
are going to have to fire at and hit them from your moving vehicle. Your weapon  
should be loaded and the safety catch should be off.'' The scenario tried to 
recreate this situation.  
 
I argue that the weekend was intended to provide a form of 'community service' 
to a group of people genuinely alarmed by violent attacks on white farmers. But 
the weekend was definitely also part of the organizers' attempt to expand the 
number of volunteers in farm watch patrol forces. These patrols, run by white 
farmers, monitor and seek to protect farms, especially at night. The patrols 
regularly mobilize up to ten bakkies to block roads and conduct stop-and-
searches. Ostensibly, their concern is stopping attacks or catching perpetrators. 
But these actions have deeper significance. A key feature of Afrikaner history is a 
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mentality of protecting the laager (circle of wagons) of God's people (Akenson, 
1992). Apartheid reflected this laager mentality insofar as it was underpinned by 
an ideology that sought to defend Afrikaner nationalism from African nationalist 
and communist attacks. Apartheid is now dead. But events such as the farm-
security weekend, and the farmers' nightly patrols, reflect Afrikaner farmers' 
contemporary sense that they are still under attack; that they still need to be on 
the defensive. Their actions are, therefore, suggestive of a new laager mentality. 
And scalecraft, I now suggest, is part of the farmers' repertoire of action.  
 
White farmers' scalecraft  
In the following discussion I seek to demonstrate that the farmers are engaging in 
scalar practices. Discursive scalar practices are one aspect here. My invitation to 
the farm security weekend reflected the organizers' enthusiasm for alerting a 
more international audience to their 'plight'. Organizers of other events have 
invited journalists from the international media and in 2006, for instance, were 
portrayed as defenders of South Africa amidst a 'wave' of Zimbabwean migrants. 
Like Franco's efforts to position Spain within a wider network of interests and 
Asian capitalists' appeals to Congress regarding H-1B work visas, the farmers 
engaged in scalar practices which sought to communicate the significance of their 
particular experience to a wider audience. But another crucial element in the 
farmers' calculations was the South African state's vulnerability to currency 
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fluctuations, investor panic, and the ANC government's reputation (cf Klein, 
2007, pages 194 -217). Like other conservative Afrikaner groups, the farm-
weekend organizers' media strategy was underpinned by a desire to embarrass the 
South African state and exploit parallels with the African basket-case story, 
which remains only too popular among the Western media. This discursive 
dimension of the farmers' activities further demonstrates that scalecraft is by no 
means only a material practice. Viewed abstractly, the farmers' actions, which 
project economic power, protect private property, and undermine the state, 
resemble the neoliberalizing project (Harvey, 2005; Peck and Tickell, 2007). 
And, like the neoliberalizing project, scalecraft is germane to their success.  
 
Interwoven with these discursive elements were the more material dimensions of 
the farmers' activities. We can discern the craft of scalar practices here, too. 
Whereas an individual farmer, for example, can patrol and monitor his/her 
farm(s) (albeit with limited success), the farm patrols operate with the assumption 
that larger groups can patrol and respond to threats over much wider areas. Area, 
extent, scope, and reach are central matters here. The geographic scale of their 
operations is of fundamental importance. A patrol which covers all farms in a 
particular area entails a much wider operation than one which focuses only on, 
say, Farms One, Two, or Three in figure 1 (note that this map is purely 
schematic, and is not based on a real place in South Africa). The farmers have 
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upscaled their defences by fashioning an 'organic' scale of governance which 
covers all farms and patrols all connecting roads and farm entrances. Upon an 
alarm being raised by telephone or radio, farmers working during the day or 
patrolling at night will speed into action, converge on particular sites, block 
roads, and detain suspects. This new 'mobile laager' seeks to construct a 
protective fence around all affiliated farms. The patrols occur within, along, and 
across a novel, assembled scale of action which the farmers skilfully craft and re-
craft each night. It is transient and temporary, as well as mobile and adaptable to 
different topographical conditions.  
 
 
Figure 1. A farm-patrol geography.  
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Like other examples of scalecraft, the farmers encounter limits and 
contradictions; failures occur. As in Henry's and Ong's cases mentioned earlier, 
space and time are complicating factors when fashioning scales of action. In the 
case of rural South Africa, farm dwellings can be entered by road, or by foot; 
responding to attacks is harder on a Sunday because farmers are at church or 
away for the weekend; each individual landowner or farmer has a particular 
history of relations stretching back a month, or forty years-hence, anticipating 
possible revenge attacks is far from easy; noticing surveillance of white-owned 
farms is harder at night than during the day. In short, the explicit goal of white 
farmers' scalecraft-to prevent attacks and to respond to them promptly; to save 
lives-is hard to attain. Lessons about how, where, or when to patrol are learned 
'on the job'. Failures occur. Attacks happen. Members of the white farming 
community are killed.  
 
And this leads to a general point: that scalecraft, like statecraft, can only ever be a 
partial solution to specific social problems. A useful way of grasping this is to 
imagine, as Massey (2005) does, the ''throwntogetherness'' of space and place. 
This notion refers to the ''happenstance juxtapositioning'' and the ''coming 
together of trajectories'' (page 141) as chaotic and ordered processes and events 
and relations combine to produce space. Scalecraft, I argue, is one way of 
intervening amidst all that uncertainty: a way of building some sort of a scalar fix 
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(Brenner, 2001). But unlike the craft of producing violins the craft of scalar 
practices cannot result in certainty and bounded closure. As has been noted in 
relational theories of space and spatiality, and as intrusions onto apparently well-
patrolled farms highlight, the throwntogetherness of space and place disrupts 
attempts at coherence and order.  
 
To conclude this discussion, there is clearly a strong sense of realism among 
white farmers. Many participants in these patrols no doubt lament the demise of 
the national laager-that is, the apartheid state-and would like to see Afrikaners 
move their security up to that scale once again. But their desired scale of 
operation is unachievable, whilst the achievable scale is, from their point of view, 
far from desirable. The result is a pragmatic, conjured scale of operation: beyond 
the individual farm, of course, and at least up to a group of between ten and thirty 
farms, if not towards a much wider area. There is a strong degree of scalecraft 
here, too: operating with and trying to understand the limits of the scale at which 
they operate, volunteer farmers involved with these farm patrols have been forced 
to learn their craft.  
 
Conclusion  
I have sought to build on and develop how geographers understand scalar 
practices. I have explored the craft of these practices by introducing the concept 
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of scalecraft, which is the often highly skilful, yet sometimes unsuccessful, 
fashioning and refashioning of geographic scale to suit particular needs. I also 
have sought to develop how we think about this craft. I have used examples from 
the literature as well as primary materials to note that scalecraft is similar to other 
crafts insofar as it requires 'workshops', learning, and innovation. The craft of 
working with scale draws upon experiences and yields innovations. It can include 
efforts intended to recast social conditions at particular geographic scales towards 
achieving a particular aim or set of aims which have narrower or broader scalar 
horizons, or efforts to upscale, downscale, or otherwise rescale social life, either 
materially or discursively (and often simultaneously). And in the lattermost part 
of the paper I also have been at pains to stress a crucial point: that scalecraft can 
only ever be a partial solution; intersecting, uneven geographies-the 
''throwntogetherness'' of space (Massey, 2005)-mean that scalecraft can be 
practised but never perfected. Some attempts fail.  
 
Specifying when and where scalecraft fails or succeeds is not the issue here-
besides, the answer has to be that it depends on the circumstances, intentions, or 
array of forces at play-but one implication of my contribution is that research 
could ask pertinent questions about how and why specific projects under certain 
conditions fail or do not. I have drawn attention to inventive efforts intended to 
recast social conditions at particular geographic scales towards achieving a 
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particular aim or set of aims which have narrower or broader scalar horizons. The 
politics caught up in these diverse examples of scalecraft are expansive and 
exciting.  
 
I suggest that the intellectual point of thinking about scalecraft is to understand 
more rigorously how social actors draw upon and produce social space; clearly, 
scale is central in this understanding of spatiality. The concept therefore connects 
with research agendas which seek to understand why some bureaucrats, say, are 
better scalar practitioners than others, or why some efforts to jump scales succeed 
whereas others fail. Recognizing the skill, and indeed the craft, at work in scalar 
practices is a necessary step to understanding why scalar discourses, or particular 
institutional fixes, fail or succeed.  
 
How scalecraft is played out in a wider range of contexts is another question for 
further research. I have not considered the social movements literature in any 
detail in this paper, but scalecraft should have applicability to scholars in this 
area. One question, for example, is that of how social movement activists learn 
from each other's successful and failed scalar practices. Work on governance and 
the scale division of the state is another immediately obvious area for further 
work on the craft of scalar practices. The success, or not, of scalar practices is 
obviously an issue for scholars interested in devolution or attempts to rescale 
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government agencies or responsibilities. I argue that scalecraft introduces to this 
area of the literature the need for research that examines how scalar practitioners 
develop specific skill sets, technical competencies, and overcome sociopolitical 
dilemmas regarding the sorts of scalar practices, fixes, or reconfigurations that 
appear to be so widespread in the contemporary period.  
 
Some caution is needed here, however. I have introduced a concept of scalecraft 
which entails bottom-up, multiple-site-focused, as well as top-down, site-specific 
attempts at fashioning geographic scales of action-but these actions inevitably 
intersect with other forms of spatiality. Advocating attention to scalecraft does 
not mean reducing all forms of spatiality to scale. In each of the examples 
discussed above, for example, issues arise regarding territory, territoriality, place, 
and networks. This point is significant for pursuing a richer understanding of 
scalecraft in diverse arenas and literatures. I have argued that scalecraft needs to 
be viewed as a key skill which actors learn as they engage in scalar practices and 
as they intervene in and produce social space. Knowledge of how actors learn the 
craft of other geographic practices might be one way to shed further light on 
scalecraft, and vice versa.  
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